Numerous recent terrorist, criminal attacks and mass violence incidents including the attack on Flight 253 and the suicide bomber attack in Afghanistan on U.S. Intelligence personnel have seen the growing use of Improvised Explosives Devices (IED) and Homemade Explosives (HME) so emergency management planners must be aware of this current and emerging hazard and the growing use of secondary devices and booby traps.
An explosives attack, even a small one, has the potential to overwhelm first responders due to the large number of victims, fatalities, fires and property destruction. It is very important that responders can plan for and safely respond to these types of incidents.
Preparation and planning is the key to a mitigating an IED, bombing, bomb threat or suspicious item incident and that includes having a clear idea of your actions before the incident occurs. The first step in your preparation is providing proper training to all response personnel. This should at least include an awareness of the hazards associated with IEDs/HME and the proper steps for the first responder to take.
If there is a local bomb squad or hazardous devices unit (HDU) in your area, ask for its assistance with your training and planning. Most bomb technicians will be glad to provide your agency with training on their procedures and equipment, since they will require your support during an actual incident.
Another excellent training resource for all first responders is the Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (IRTB) courses in Soccoro, NM, funded through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This course gives first responders information regarding planning for and responding to IED or terrorist events. The student will be able to witness live explosive events ranging from a small pipe bomb to a large car bomb. The course also allows the student to return to their respective agency and provide awareness-level training. For additional information, see www.emrtc.nmt.edu/training/
An additional planning resource is the Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) which leads the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) diverse efforts to deter, detect, prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist improvised explosive device (IED) threats. OBP works to ensure that current activities function together efficiently to meet evolving bombing threats and that new capabilities to improve national preparedness for IED’s are developed at all levels of government, among the public, and within the private sector.
OBP focuses on three core missions: Coordination of national efforts, Analysis of counter-IED requirements and capabilities, and Promotion of information sharing and IED awareness and vigilance. At the local level, the Office for Bombing Prevention works with emergency services and security partners in major cities to provide Multi-Jurisdiction IED Security Workshops (MJIEDWS). These plans provide a consistent, repeatable IED security planning model for IED threats nationwide that integrate the capabilities of multiple emergency services providers in areas with many local jurisdictions. For additional information see http://www.dhs.gov/ or contact OBP@dhs.gov
Thursday, December 31, 2009
Monday, December 28, 2009
Terrorist and Criminal Attacks: Prevention, Prevention, Prevention
Terrorist and Criminal Attacks: Prevention, Prevention, Prevention
Once the terrorist or criminal attacker is moving to the target with their weapons in hand or boarding the aircraft with their homemade explosives (HME) after days, weeks and months of planning, the possibility of stopping the attack without loss of life is very low.
Prevention is the best tool in trying to prevent and stopping terrorist and criminal mass violence incidents from occurring. Information sharing, situational awareness, pre-incident indicators (PII) are the best tools available to public safety agencies to assist in this effort. Disrupting these incidents during their planning stage when possible is the best and most effective option available.
All that can be done at this point is to try and minimize the casualties and end the attack as quickly and safely as possible. Counter terrorism is the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to a terrorist incident or a threat of a terrorist incident and prevention is the best option available.
Most of the information sharing that is needed can take place at an unclassified security level by local, regional and state public safety agencies. Information sharing can be a valuable tool. This can take place at any level of government such as local, municipal, county, regional, state and federal.
Once the terrorist or criminal attacker is moving to the target with their weapons in hand or boarding the aircraft with their homemade explosives (HME) after days, weeks and months of planning, the possibility of stopping the attack without loss of life is very low.
Prevention is the best tool in trying to prevent and stopping terrorist and criminal mass violence incidents from occurring. Information sharing, situational awareness, pre-incident indicators (PII) are the best tools available to public safety agencies to assist in this effort. Disrupting these incidents during their planning stage when possible is the best and most effective option available.
All that can be done at this point is to try and minimize the casualties and end the attack as quickly and safely as possible. Counter terrorism is the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to a terrorist incident or a threat of a terrorist incident and prevention is the best option available.
Most of the information sharing that is needed can take place at an unclassified security level by local, regional and state public safety agencies. Information sharing can be a valuable tool. This can take place at any level of government such as local, municipal, county, regional, state and federal.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Met predicts Mumbai-style attack on London
Met predicts Mumbai-style attack on London
Increased intelligence chatter picked up by authorities has led Scotland Yard to warn London businesses a Mumbai style terror attack on the capital may be in the planning stages. This according to a report in The TimesOnline. In the report, a senior detective from SO15, the Metropolitan police counter-terrorism command, said: “Mumbai is coming to London".
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article6962867.ece
Increased intelligence chatter picked up by authorities has led Scotland Yard to warn London businesses a Mumbai style terror attack on the capital may be in the planning stages. This according to a report in The TimesOnline. In the report, a senior detective from SO15, the Metropolitan police counter-terrorism command, said: “Mumbai is coming to London".
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article6962867.ece
Friday, December 18, 2009
First Responder Critical Incident Guide
First Responder Critical Incident Guide identifies key functions that are essential for first responders (Fire, EMS, Law Enforcement, Special Teams, Military, etc.) during the first 10–30 minutes of a “critical incident”. It addresses recognition, identification and response issues that first responders must deal with prior to the arrival of those with specialized training and equipment.
Critical Incident Guide (323065) is extremely durable for field use. It is printed on synthetic paper that is tearproof and waterproof and has large readable type for low light and flashlight conditions.
http://www.redhatpub.com/page1/page3/page3.html
In addition to a general overview of first responder responsibilities on the scene of a critical incident, it contains easy-to-follow response procedures for the following incidents:
• Bottle Bombs
• Improvised Explosive Devices
• Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)
• Continued IED Threat / Attack
• Suspicious Letter / Package Indicators
• Suspicious Powders / Substances Indicators and Response
• Clandestine Drug Labs
• Indoor Marijuana Grow Operations
• Civil Unrest Planning and Response
• Mass Shooting / Active Shooter
• Fire/EMS Scene Safety at Scenes of Violence
• Suicide Bomber
• Bomb Threats
• Explosives Post-Blast Response
http://www.redhatpub.com/page1/page3/page3.html
Critical Incident Guide (323065) is extremely durable for field use. It is printed on synthetic paper that is tearproof and waterproof and has large readable type for low light and flashlight conditions.
http://www.redhatpub.com/page1/page3/page3.html
In addition to a general overview of first responder responsibilities on the scene of a critical incident, it contains easy-to-follow response procedures for the following incidents:
• Bottle Bombs
• Improvised Explosive Devices
• Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)
• Continued IED Threat / Attack
• Suspicious Letter / Package Indicators
• Suspicious Powders / Substances Indicators and Response
• Clandestine Drug Labs
• Indoor Marijuana Grow Operations
• Civil Unrest Planning and Response
• Mass Shooting / Active Shooter
• Fire/EMS Scene Safety at Scenes of Violence
• Suicide Bomber
• Bomb Threats
• Explosives Post-Blast Response
http://www.redhatpub.com/page1/page3/page3.html
Monday, December 7, 2009
Governor Kaine Releases Revisions to Virginia Tech Review Panel Report
Governor Kaine Releases Revisions to Virginia Tech Review Panel Report
- Addendum includes revised timeline of events, additions and corrections to chapters; makes no changes to original conclusions or recommendations of 2007 independent review panel -
RICHMOND - Governor Timothy M. Kaine today released an Addendum to the Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel that incorporates corrections, clarifications, and additions proposed by victims, their families, and Virginia Tech. The Addendum - produced by Arlington, VA-based TriData - takes into account information that has come into the public domain since the submission of the original panel report in August 2007, including the Cook Counseling Center records of Seung Hui Cho discovered earlier this year. While the Addendum corrects or clarifies the facts of the panel report, the review and revision process led to no changes in the conclusions or recommendations of the panel.
"What happened at Virginia Tech is by its very nature inexplicable, and we may never fully understand the tragic events that transpired that terrible day. However, the Commonwealth has remained committed to providing as accurate a factual narrative as possible," said Governor Kaine. "By incorporating the suggestions of victims, their families, and the university, the Addendum is intended to more accurately describe the events that transpired and the responses they produced."
The intent of the original report by the Virginia Tech Review Panel was to provide recommendations on ways to prevent future tragedies on university campuses. The revisions to the report were compiled, analyzed, and incorporated into the document as appropriate by TriData, the firm that provided research and staff support for the independent review panel convened in the aftermath of the Virginia Tech tragedy. The majority of the incorporated revisions are presented as an "Additions and Corrections" subsection for each chapter. Some chapters contain a combination of additions, corrections, and clarifications, while other chapters remain unchanged. No line changes have been made to the text of the original report.
The third chapter of the report is the single notable exception to the overall format of the Addendum. "Chapter III- Revised Timeline of Events" has been rewritten to include more detailed information and more precise times of events leading up to, during, and after the shootings on April 16, 2007. There is no distinction in the timeline between information included in the original document and information that has been added or revised.
The Addendum makes no changes to the conclusions and recommendations set forth by the panel in their original report. Many of the recommendations made by the 2007 report were enacted during the 2008 session of the General Assembly, including the clarification of information sharing procedures and involuntary commitment criteria, mandatory creation of emergency plans for colleges and universities, restrictions on firearm access for those adjudicated mentally ill, and the investment of $41 million dollars in the state's mental health operations.
Governor Kaine appointed the Virginia Tech Review Panel on April 19, 2007 to perform an independent, thorough, and objective assessment of the events of April 16. The Governor charged the Panel with focusing on what went right, what went wrong, what practices should be considered best practices, and what practices were in need of improvement. The group delivered their report to the Governor on August 30, 2007 in time for implementation before students returned to campus in the fall.
The Addendum to the Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel can be found on the Governor's website in .pdf form at: http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport-addendum.cfm
- Addendum includes revised timeline of events, additions and corrections to chapters; makes no changes to original conclusions or recommendations of 2007 independent review panel -
RICHMOND - Governor Timothy M. Kaine today released an Addendum to the Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel that incorporates corrections, clarifications, and additions proposed by victims, their families, and Virginia Tech. The Addendum - produced by Arlington, VA-based TriData - takes into account information that has come into the public domain since the submission of the original panel report in August 2007, including the Cook Counseling Center records of Seung Hui Cho discovered earlier this year. While the Addendum corrects or clarifies the facts of the panel report, the review and revision process led to no changes in the conclusions or recommendations of the panel.
"What happened at Virginia Tech is by its very nature inexplicable, and we may never fully understand the tragic events that transpired that terrible day. However, the Commonwealth has remained committed to providing as accurate a factual narrative as possible," said Governor Kaine. "By incorporating the suggestions of victims, their families, and the university, the Addendum is intended to more accurately describe the events that transpired and the responses they produced."
The intent of the original report by the Virginia Tech Review Panel was to provide recommendations on ways to prevent future tragedies on university campuses. The revisions to the report were compiled, analyzed, and incorporated into the document as appropriate by TriData, the firm that provided research and staff support for the independent review panel convened in the aftermath of the Virginia Tech tragedy. The majority of the incorporated revisions are presented as an "Additions and Corrections" subsection for each chapter. Some chapters contain a combination of additions, corrections, and clarifications, while other chapters remain unchanged. No line changes have been made to the text of the original report.
The third chapter of the report is the single notable exception to the overall format of the Addendum. "Chapter III- Revised Timeline of Events" has been rewritten to include more detailed information and more precise times of events leading up to, during, and after the shootings on April 16, 2007. There is no distinction in the timeline between information included in the original document and information that has been added or revised.
The Addendum makes no changes to the conclusions and recommendations set forth by the panel in their original report. Many of the recommendations made by the 2007 report were enacted during the 2008 session of the General Assembly, including the clarification of information sharing procedures and involuntary commitment criteria, mandatory creation of emergency plans for colleges and universities, restrictions on firearm access for those adjudicated mentally ill, and the investment of $41 million dollars in the state's mental health operations.
Governor Kaine appointed the Virginia Tech Review Panel on April 19, 2007 to perform an independent, thorough, and objective assessment of the events of April 16. The Governor charged the Panel with focusing on what went right, what went wrong, what practices should be considered best practices, and what practices were in need of improvement. The group delivered their report to the Governor on August 30, 2007 in time for implementation before students returned to campus in the fall.
The Addendum to the Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel can be found on the Governor's website in .pdf form at: http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport-addendum.cfm
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